Being a Non-Profit Hospital CEO Means Never Having to Say You Are Sorry

When my arm was twisted heartily to see the movie "Love Story" a very long time ago, I could never understand why so many audience members sighed upon hearing that immortal line, "love means never having to say you're sorry."  I could not understand it then, and still cannot.

However, it seems that for reasons that are not any more clear, being the CEO of a not-for-profit hospital or hospital system also means never having to say you are sorry, as shown in some recent stories from the media.

Not Sorry for Leaving

Originally published in the Fargo (ND) InForum:

The merger 1½ years ago of Sanford Health and MeritCare created a new entity that doubled in size and covers a service area of more than 130,000 square miles.

But the unified health care giant needed only one top executive, and the departing chief administrator received a $1 million contract buyout, according to documents obtained by The Forum.

Dr. Roger Gilbertson, a neuroradiologist who had served as MeritCare’s top executive since its founding 17 years earlier, received a 'separation payment' provided by his contract of $1,000,920, according to a report Sanford filed with the Internal Revenue Service that recently became available.

Not only did Dr Gilbertson not have to say he was sorry for leaving, he collected what amounted to a million dollar plus bonus just for going out the door.

Not Sorry for Leaving Amidst Financial Losses

A long story in the Atlanta Journal Constitution discussed compensation for a number of Atlanta area hospital and hospital system CEOs.  For example,

Edward Bonn of Southern Regional Health System, which operates Southern Regional Medical Center and two affiliated facilities, made $2,610,175 in fiscal 2009. Bonn left the system that year and received his pay of $421,822 plus $2.2 million from a retirement plan. Hospital CEOs commonly receive extra pay from retirement plans when they leave.

Bonn did not receive a bonus because the hospital system lost $12 million that year, the hospital said.

Mr Bonn apparently did not need to say he was sorry for collecting over $2 million when that amount was equal to about one-sixth of his system's yearly loss.

Not Sorry for Financial Losses Plus a "Culture of Entitlement"

This story was in the Peterborough (NH) Examiner:

Former Peterborough Regional Health Centre CEO Paul Darby was given at least $340,126 plus benefits as a financial package after his retirement in December 2009.


He didn't work a single day or offer a single service in 2010 while earning the second top salary at PRHC, just behind current CEO Ken Tremblay.

'The compensations with Paul were in line with similar arrangements with other CEOs and other public hospitals which include support to the executive following the employment period,' board chairwomen Barb Cameron said. 'It is important that we are able to make transitions between leaders smoothly and these kinds of arrangements with the executive allow us to do that.'

Darby retired before a whirlwind of controversy hit the hospital last year including a scathing peer-review report blaming hospital top brass for a 'culture of entitlement' leading to spiraling, cumulative debt.


When Darby left, the hospital faced a growing deficit of just under $25 million.

He was paid $364,275 in 2009, $310,983 in 2008 and $269,419 in 2007.

At least his severance package was less than one-sixth of the deficit.
Not Sorry for Not Even Revealing One's Salary

Here is a local Rhode Island story reported by WPRI:

The nonprofit group that runs three Rhode Island Hospitals including Women & Infants won’t say whether its new chief executive will receive a seven-figure pay package that matches his predecessor’s.

Care New England tapped Cambridge Health Alliance CEO Dennis Keefe as its new president and CEO this week. He will succeed John Hynes, who is retiring, in August.

Care New England spokeswoman May Kernan said the organization would not release details about Keefe’s compensation. 'Other than complying with public reporting requirements as part of the federal [IRS] 990 forms, we do not disclose personal salary information,' she told WPRI.com in an email.

Hynes’ compensation totaled $1.5 million in 2008-09, up from $873,332 in 2007-08, tax records show.

Note that the hired executives of big for-profit corporations also are increasingly uncomfortable about public discussion of their compensation (see this post).
Where All CEOs Are Above Average

The rationales presented for such apparently exceptional treatment given non-profit hospital CEOs (and other hired health care managers) are those we have heard before.

The most prominent rationale for exceptional treatment of an individual CEO is that he (or rarely she) was such an exceptional leader. This would be more believable if it was not used so often, suggesting that those who defend these leaders, often including the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, believe all hospital CEOs, like the mythical children of Lake Woebegone, are above average.

For example, the InForum article provided this explanation of Dr Gilbertson's compensation:

The only comment Sanford provided The Forum was a statement about Gilbertson’s contributions to MeritCare over his long tenure.

'Dr. Gilbertson’s gift to this region is invaluable – 30 years in medicine and 17 years as President/CEO of MeritCare only glance the surface,' said Andrew Richberg, a Sanford executive vice president. 'His vision for health care integration, medical knowledge and dedication to patients made him a pillar in our industry.'

Gilbertson’s legacy, Richberg added, is 'strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people, in their hometowns, all across the region.'

While the article did not suggest Dr Gilbertson's leadership was poor, it is hard to believe that he alone was responsible for "strong, safe and sustainable health care for all people ... all across the region." I am sure there are many other health care professionals in North Dakota who have worked for many years, and who have a strong vision, good medical knowledge, and dedication to patients.  I am sure almost none got $1 million severance packages.  If health care in North Dakota is really that good, is that not because of a lot of hard work by a lot of health care professionals?

The rationale of exceptional treatment for exceptional individuals would also be more believable if it was not used to defend CEOs whose organization performed poorly under their leadership. For example, in the Peterborough Examiner:

'I would like to acknowledge that these are big salaries, but they are big positions in a large hospital involving large responsibilities and requiring unique skills,' [hospital board of trustees chairwoman] Cameron said,....

Would not having the large responsibility for a large deficit argue against a large severance package?

The Market Made Us Do It

Despite substantial evidence and strong arguments (see here) that health care cannot approach being an ideal free market, another favorite rationale for CEO exceptionalism is that the market made us do it. For example, per the AJC:

The number of people who can manage these facilities is limited and recruitment is competitive, [Georgia Hospital Association President Joseph] Parker said.

Qualified leaders will gravitate to other fields over time if compensation for nonprofit CEOs is decreased, [executive search consulting company Mercer Inc partner Jose] Pagoaga said. The 'substandard leadership' that replaces them will degrade the quality of medical care for the community.

There’s debate on the issue.

It’s hard to believe that people who choose the field of charitable medical care would leave because they make only $800,000 a year instead of $1.5 million, said Mark Rukavina, executive director of the Access Project, a Boston patient advocacy organization.

But Pagoaga said nonprofit hospitals cannot count on their charitable duty to attract and retain the best administrators.

'Yes, it’s a social mission, but this is not the priesthood and these people have not taken a vow of poverty,' he said. 'You can’t discount the views of people that look at this as an altruistic mission and think that pay should therefore be limited. All I’m saying is there is an entirely different point of view based on free-market principles.'

In the real world, of course, poverty would hardly be defined as an income less than $1 million a year. Mr Pagoaga never explicated the point of view based on "free-market principles," but I wonder if it can be summarized as "greed is good?"  It would be interesting to see how Mr Pagoaga could explain how health care is like unto an ideal free market.  

Non-Profit Organizations are Not Very Different from For-Profit

Perhaps the most intriguing argument was found in the AJC article:

Pay in excess of $1 million a year may seem high for an organization subsidized by taxpayers, but hospital executives and industry representatives said the public should think of these hospitals not as charities, but as complex, billion-dollar organizations.

Georgia hospitals report to 27 state and federal agencies and engage in multimillion-dollar building projects. The larger hospital systems have billions in revenue and are among the largest employers in their communities. Many also operate for-profit subsidiaries.

'You can’t lose sight of the fact that it’s not an ice cream shop on the side of the street,' said Joseph Parker, president of the Georgia Hospital Association.

Note that currently US non-profit organizations do not have to report much data on their for-profit subsidiaries.  The above argument suggests they deserve considerably more scrutiny.
Of course, that last explanation begs the question of why the compensation of for-profit hired executives should be even higher, with CEO compensation often well more than two orders of magnitude, that is, hundreds of times higher than that of the lowest paid also hired employees (see this post).

Summary

I submit that non-profit hospitals and hospital systems do have a "social mission," which ought to be upheld by their leadership. Despite the rationales supplied above, the leaders ought to be accountable, which may sometimes mean having to say they are sorry.

As I have repeated endlessly,... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.

What Is to Be Done?

Based on our ever enlarging file of cases on compensation of the top hired managers of non-profit health care organizations, let me make some concrete suggestions, based on my humble opinion.

A step forward would be to make the finances and compensation arrangements of health care non-profit organizations at least as transparent as those of large public for-profit organizations. So my big idea is:

- Non-profit health care organizations above a reasonable threshold size should provide prompt, public, annual reports analogous and very similar to the reports required by the US Securities and Exchange Commission of public, for-profit companies.

These reports should include, at a minimum, a summary of financial and operational status, an audited financial report, an explanation and accounting for any for-profit subsidiaries and any interlocking non-profit organizations, the compensation given to the CEO and some minimum number of the top-paid officers and employees, a detailed explanation and rationale for the pay of these individuals, and a listing of other affiliations and all conflicts of interest affecting them.

If need to supply such information causes non-profit health care organizations' hired executives and boards of trustees some cognitive dissonance, that would be a good thing. 

More Revelations About How Top Managers Prosper While Care-Giving Employees are Laid Off This Time Leads to Labor Strife

Last month, we discussed the contrast between executive compensation at Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System (SVMH), a small California public hospital system, and the treatment of employees in the trenches. While the hospital had laid off workers ostensibly because of the poor economic climate, the local newspaper revealed that its CEO was leaving with a multi-million dollar retirement package, and that some of his supposed severance pay had been given him before he was severed.

This month, amidst growing labor unrest partially driven by the disparate treatment of the hired top manager and the more lowly employees who actually take care of patients, a new report revealed further contrasts between how hired executives and "regular" employees are treated.

Let me give a blow by blow summary in chronological order.

The Employees Strike

This month, the hospital system suffered its first strike ever, partially in response to the discrepancy between executive compensation and how lesser employees were treated.  According to the Los Angeles Times:

About 850 workers at a Salinas public hospital went on strike Tuesday, about two months after revelations of a multimillion-dollar pension awarded to the hospital's CEO.

Caregivers at Salinas Valley Memorial Hospital walked off their jobs at 6 a.m., according to representatives of the National Union of Healthcare Workers. The workers are protesting proposed layoffs and cuts to their retirement benefits as well as pay given to hospital executives and consultants.

The Times reported in April on the retirement package granted the hospital's outgoing chief executive, Samuel Downing, which included about $5 million in supplemental payments along with a $150,000 annual benefit. Hospital officials and board members have defended the package, saying that Downing was a successful leader throughout his 27 years as CEO.

The hospital workers' union has been negotiating with administrators since January and indicated its plan to strike earlier this month, according to union vice president John Borsos.

'There's a sense of disbelief here that the hospital can come up with millions of dollars for Downing's retirement and millions for their consultants, but when it comes to caregivers by the bedside, they say they can't find the money,' he said.

The Management's Lock-Out

Then, hospital managers' responses to the strike provoked more anger from union members, and one state agency affirmed their complaints, according to The Californian:

The California Public Employment Relations Board issued a five-page complaint against Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare Systems, alleging that the public hospital district violated several sections of state labor law when it barred striking workers from returning to their posts Wednesday.

Prompted by charges brought by the National Union of Healthcare Workers, PERB Regional Attorney Katharine Nyman charged SVMH with committing unfair labor practices and with violating PERB regulations in the way it blocked workers from going back to work after Tuesday's one-day labor walk-out.

Strikers Picket a Board Member

Then, the union escalated its protest by picketing the house of the hospital board treasurer, according to television station KION:

Thursday morning, some union members took their demonstration from the front entrance of SVMH directly to the home of Harry Wardwell, Treasurer of the SVMH Board of Directors and President of Rabobank. 129 employees were still unable to go back on the job, replaced by temporary workers for one more day.

Wardwell is one of five publicly elected members of Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System's Board of Directors.

'We have to draw the Salinas community and everybody in the hospital district. Every resident in this neighborhood votes and they need to know that Harry Wardwell is making these cuts,' said Marilyn Benson, an NUHW member.

How Executive Pay Rose Faster than Inflation While Employees Were Laid Off

Just after that protest ended, The California published a new article about executive compensation:

At the same time it laid off hundreds of rank and file employees, the Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare System steadily provided generous increases to the salary and benefits packages of its senior executive team, records show.

SVMH vice presidents Bev Ranzenberger, John Fletcher, Dr. David Perrott, Elizabeth Lorenzi, Irene Neumeister and James Griffith all received double-digit increases in their total compensation packages during the years of 2005 through 2010 according to an SVMH document obtained by The Californian on Thursday.

And while not all of the vice presidents received salary increases every year during that time period, they all received percentageincreases in total salary and benefits of 29.4 percent to 153.8 percent, which translates to annual average increases of between 5.9 percent and 30.8 percent. By comparison, for the12 months that ended in May, the national rate of inflation rose just 3.6 percent, based on the Consumer Price Index.

News of the increases incensed National Union of Healthcare Workers leaders whose members went on a one-day strike Tuesday after declaring an impasse with health care district management over wage and benefit issues and over how many more employees will be laid off as SVMH continues to struggle with reducing costs.

'How could a majority of the board approve of the outrageous salary increases while claiming that the hospital had to lay off hundreds of caregivers out of financial necessity?' asked union vice president John Borsos. 'It's not just hypocritical, but it demonstrates that the hospital has more than enough money to keep caregivers at the bedside.'

Note that the SVMH leadership's defense of the pay given top executives was typical of explanations of outsize pay given to other health care leaders:

But according to SVMH spokeswoman Adrienne Laurent, the executives' salaries are in keeping with industry standards and have been reviewed by an outside consulting agency for appropriateness.

"Compensation for our hospital executives is not taken lightly, and that's why our [Board of Directors] engaged an outside, third party to assist us in this process. An important goal set forth by our board is that all of our employees, including our executives, receive compensation that is comparable to our competitors. In order for us to successfully recruit and retain the best people, it is critical that we remain competitive with not only other public district hospitals, but also private companies," Laurent wrote in an email to The Californian.

In her email, however, Laurent did not address the seeming disparity of the institution increasing executive salaries while at the same laying-off employees.

Laurent also added that the six SVMH vice presidents do not enjoy some of the standard perquisites offered to executives at other health care institutions such as bonuses and car and cellphone allowances.

It must be tough having to pay for a cell-phone package when one's salary is only somewhat in excess of a quarter-million dollars a year.

Note that the irony of defending high pay to recruit "the best people" to executive positions while health care professionals are being laid off seemed to escape Ms Laurent.
Summary

Once again we see how the notion that "top management are different from you and me" plays out throughout the health care system. Even at a small public community hospital system, the top hired managers seem to feel entitled to be treated differently, and much better than other employees, even those who directly care for patients.  Top hired managers do not flinch at the doublethink necessary to use poor financial results as a rationale for laying-off line employees, but simultaneously for hiking the pay of top hired managers.

Again, we see how top hired managers of all sorts of health care organizations, big and small, for-profit, not-for-profit and government, delivering direct care, and manufacturing products used in care, have become accountable only to themselves. This situation, of course, produces health care done first for the benefit of its new overlords.

The case of Salinas Valley Memorial Healthcare, however, also now demonstrates that this situation is starting to produce reactions.  It now seems that the ordinary employees of health care organizations are not continuing to welcome their new overlords. SVMH endured its first strike ever mainly in response to the disparity between how top hired managers treated other employees and treated themselves. Angry employees publicly identified the board of trustees that seemed to exert no functional oversight over top management as part of the problem. I suspect that if current trends continue, we will see more labor unrest, and that unrest will be directed at hired managers and those who are supposed to oversee them.

This may eventually yield major changes in how health care is lead, but if the confrontations continue, these changes may be very messy, and continued strife may end up being bad for everyone.

Instead, we should consider real, peaceful health care reform. As I have repeated endlessly,... health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research. On the other hand, those who authorize, direct and implement bad behavior ought to suffer negative consequences sufficient to deter future bad behavior.


If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

Logical Fallacies in Support of Payments for Board Members of Non-Profit Health Insurers

The kerfuffle over the huge golden parachute given the departing CEO of an ostensibly non-profit Massachusetts health insurer/ managed care organization continues to evolve (see posts here and here), providing some new insight into governance problems afflicting health care organizations. 

One of the issues that aroused initially aroused concern was that Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield paid the members of its board of trustees substantial amount, an unusual practice for a non-profit organization.  Board members who feel they owe their pay to the CEO they are supposed to be overseeing might be particularly inclined to over pay that same CEO.

Nonetheless, the Boston Globe just reported that other non-profit Massachusetts health insurers were defending their payments to board members:

The state’s second- and third-largest health insurers said yesterday their board members have decided to keep paying themselves five-figure annual fees despite objections from the state attorney general and an inquiry into directors’ compensation at nonprofit health plans.

The rationales for these decisions were fascinating, amounting to four variations of special pleading, plus an appeal to tradition.

Special pleading: Our board members are experienced and independent

'Good governance is advanced by the recruitment and retention of experienced, independent, reasonably compensated directors,' Harvard Pilgrim said in its statement. 'In 2010, our board worked more than 2,000 hours.'

I doubt any non-profit organization would admit to not wanting experienced, independent board members,  but very few other non-profits pay their board members. Asserting that board members of the Massachusetts insurance companies especially deserve pay because of characteristics they share with other members of other boards who are not paid amounts to a special pleading.

The second statement seems just to be a simple exaggeration, since 2000 hours a year implies that the board members work there full-time (40 hours/week * 50 weeks = 2000 hours).  

Special Pleading: Our board members are skilled and experienced

Wellesley-based Harvard Pilgrim, however, said in its statement that board members 'apply their specialized experience and skills in the areas of medicine, accounting, finance and law, to support our company and its mission. Our board serves as responsible, independent fiscal stewards for our members’ premium dollars.'

Again, board members of all sorts of non-profit organizations could be described in similar terms. So using this as an argument for paying board members when members with the same attributes of other boards are not paid is another special pleading.

Special Pleading: Our boards have great responsibility

Tufts, based in Watertown, said its board believes there is 'an additional overlay of responsibility' for directors of a health insurance company.

'Unlike the directors of other nonprofits, they are subject to distinct regulatory considerations,' the Tufts statement said. 'Therefore, compensation for time, commitment and skill of top talent is a responsible approach for the oversight of an organization that provides health care coverage to hundreds of thousands' of members.

Of course, boards of hospitals have their own "distinct regulatory considerations," as do boards of academic institutions  Boards of hospitals are also responsible for the health of their patients and boards of academic institutions are responsible for the education of their students. So this is a third example of a special pleading.

Special Pleading: Our responsibility, our time, our effort
Appeal to Tradition: Our tradition is to pay directors

The history and tradition of nonprofit health plans is to pay [directors] in this state. These are people from various walks of life who bring a skill set. These are not political hacks. . . . It’s because of the responsibility, the time, the effort, and the work you have to put into it. It’s a lot of homework.

It is true that the four non-profit Massachusetts health insurers all apparently did pay their board members, although in many other states, members of the boards of non-profit health insurers were not paid. But in the absence of any further argument that Massachusetts organizations were right when the others were wrong, this amounts to an appeal to tradition.   The rest of this personal statement was again a special pleading. 

Summary

Board members of non-profit organizations generally are said to have three duties, as per BoardSource:
- The Duty of Care: "a board member owes the duty to exercise reasonable care when he or she makes a decision as a steward of the organization."
- The Duty of Loyalty: "a board member must give undivided allegiance when making decisions affecting the organization. This means that a board member can never use information obtained as a member for personal gain, but must act in the best interests of the organization."
- The Duty of Obedience: "The duty of obedience requires board members to be faithful to the organization's mission. They are not permitted to act in a way that is inconsistent with the central goals of the organization."

The notion that boards stewarding non-profit organizations, including health care organizations, have these core responsibilities seems to have become increasingly ignored and forgotten in an increasingly commercialized health care environment.  Simply fulfilling these duties should not be regarded as exceptional board service, and certainly not so exceptional as to require pay.  The fallacious arguments made on behalf of lucrative payments given to members of the boards of two of the more highly regarded non-profit health insurance corporations in the country indicate how low governance and stewardship of health care organizations has sunk.

Again, we need governance of health care organization by people who understand their fundamental duties, who are willing to be accountable, and who put their organizations' mission ahead of personal gain. 

Those who profess concern about the stewardship of health care need not go far to find examples of fundamental misconceptions about what such stewardship involves.  We need to restore core values of governance to our health care organizations. 

The Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield CEO's Golden Parachute - "'Have's' Greasing One Another's Pockets"

We have frequently discussed the kind of compensation now frequently given to leaders of health care organizations.  Although often even the most disproportionately outrageous compensation only attracts transient interest, a recent regional story in this genre has really gotten legs.

How Big the Golden Parachute?
The story was about the severance package given to one Cleve L Killingsworth, the former CEO of not-for-profit health care insurance company Massachusetts Blue Cross Blue Shield.  While first reported as being worth $8.6 million,(1) the estimate of his total severance was soon raised to $11 million.(2)

This is a Way to Control Costs?

Immediately, that amount was contrasted with the supposed emphasis of the company on controlling costs, and its recent poor performance:

Killingsworth’s tenure at Blue Cross, which has nearly 3 million members, was marked by efforts to address skyrocketing medical costs by launching a 'global payment' pilot program, under which health care providers are given an annual budget and incentives to keep patients healthy and out of the hospital.

'Without Cleve’s leadership, we wouldn’t be where we are today in shifting from fee-for-service to global payments,' said senior vice president Jay McQuaide.

But the insurer stumbled financially in recent years, recording back-to-back operating losses totaling nearly $215 million in 2009 and 2010 as the economy weakened and state regulators acted to limit premium increases for policies covering small businesses and individuals.(3)

Then focus shifted to the company's board of trustees, which lead to recognition of some more striking contrasts. First, some prominent members of the board which approved the huge golden parachute had been vocal supporters of controlling health care costs:

Key members of the Blue Cross Blue Shield board that gave the nod to then-CEO Cleve Killingsworth’s controversial $11 million severance have been public advocates for trimming soaring health-care costs — even as they sat on a panel that quietly approved the departing chief’s golden parachute.

Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce President Paul Guzzi has crusaded to lower health-care costs in his day job representing the interests of local businesses, many of which struggle under the burden of rising premiums for their employee health plans.

'Advancing payment reform to bring health-care costs under control' is one of the Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce’s top policy agenda items, Guzzi said in a statement in January. Guzzi made $84,463 as the Blue Cross board chairman at the time of the Killingsworth vote.

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO who made $72,700 as a Blue Cross board member in 2010, has championed health-care cost reduction for the thousands of union members he represents.

'Unions stand ready to be part of the solution to the health-care cost crisis in which we all find ourselves,' Haynes said in an AFL-CIO statement in January. 'The only way to ensure we are part of the solution is to guarantee that we have a voice and meaningful role in how cost savings are achieved.'

Bentley University president Gloria Larson, who earned $76,400 as a Blue Cross board member last year, helped organize a confab of business, labor and political leaders in Ashland in January that addressed rising health-care costs. Those who planned to attend reportedly included two other Blue Cross board members — Haynes and former Suffolk District Attorney Ralph C. Martin II.(4)

Why Pay a Non-Profit's Trustees?

Also, as the quote above pointed out, it appears that the board members were themselves paid fairly well for a very part-time job, even though in general trustees of not-for-profit organizations serve as unpaid volunteers. However, it was soon revealed the paying board members is common practice for all Massachusetts non-profit health insurance companies.(5)

Some Blue Cross board members tried to defuse the issue by minimizing the impact of their pay on the organization's total budget:

Robert J. Haynes, president of the Massachusetts AFL-CIO and a critic of excessive corporate pay, was questioned about his role on the board following a State House news conference he held on a union-backed plan aimed at lowering health care costs. He said he would not give up his $72,000 annual payment from Blue Cross until the issue was reviewed by the company, and said the money given to board members does not play a role in rising health care costs.

'The cost of health insurance is not affected very much,' Haynes said. 'It’s about $1 million that board members get paid. On $13 billion in revenue, it’s like pennies a year.' (6)

What Should the New CEO Be Paid?
However, soon the board felt the need to suddenly stop paying itself.(7) The current Blue Cross CEO noted how little he would be paid:

Dreyfus emphasized that he has taken 'rock-bottom-of-the-market' compensation levels -- $800,000 in base pay with the opportunity for $1.6 million in severance – for comparable positions in the insurance industry.

'I will be one of the lowest paid Blue Cross executives in the country,' he said.... (8)

Things are tough all over.

What is Mr Killingsworth Now Up To?

Meanwhile, Mr Killingsworth seems to be weathering the storm. An enterprising reporter attempted to interview him in his house in New York, described as "a sprawling clapboard monstrosity with the charm of an assisted-living facility." However, "Mr Killingsworth was nowhere to be found," and Mrs Killingsworth "slammed the door" on the reporter.  (See picture in cited article.)  (9)

Possibly, Mr Killingworth was away tending his other responsibilities, which include serving on the Boards of Directors of The Traveler's Company and TIAA-CREF, and apparently despite their apparently competitive nature, on the boards of the Harvard Medical School and Boston University.

The Reaction

There were plenty of reactions, mostly vigorously unfavorable, to the contrast between the company's non-profit status, supposed commitment to reducing costs, and financial performance, on one hand, and the compensation given to executives, and board members:

"undermines the credibility of insurers when they say they're serious about bringing down the cost of care" Deidre Cummings, President of the Massachusetts Public Interest Research Group (3)

"If you lose $149 million and then you get paid $11 million for doing it, it is very clear to people where their health-care dollars are going.  And it is not to health care." - Ethan Rome, Health Care for America Now (2)

There were also judgments that health care had become the sandbox for wealthy and well-connected insiders, at the expense of everyone else:

"What we have here today is yet another enraging story of the 'haves'greasing one another's pockets while the 'have-nots' slip beneath the waves." Margery Egan, columnist for the Boston Herald(10)

"Therein lies the problem with boards.  They're supposed to provide oversight, but too often it's the same people tossing money at each other to serve on the boards of each other's companies, the operative word always being 'Yes!'" Brian McGrory, Boston Globe columnist (5)

Most pessimistically:

"If Massachusetts is the model, then national health care reform is ultimately doomed." Derrick Z Jackson, Boston Globe columnist (11)

I am actually now more optimistic.  The coverage of this story really shows that the anechoic effect may be fading .  There is starting to be frank discussion of the role of bad leadership of health care organizations as a cause of health care dysfunction.  If we start to admit these problems, maybe we can figure out solutions.

I will add just one opinion to those expressed in these articles.  The clear problem here is again perverse incentives.  The issue with how much this CEO was paid, and how his board members were paid was not mainly the diversion from direct health care of the funds involved.  Instead, the concerns ought to be: what sorts of people do these payments attract?  Are they the sorts of people who will uphold the organization's mission?  Once attracted, what sorts of incentives do the prospects of these payments supply for what sorts of decisions?  Do these sorts of incentives lead to decisions that uphold the mission in the long-term?

In this case, these concerns are underlined by the Blue Cross trustees' cavalier attitude to their own pay, and the new CEO's belief that $800,000 a year is "rock-bottom." 

I hope that the amount of discussion this case provoked might actually lead to some needed regional changes.

More globally, as we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

References


1.  Gil G. Former Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m last year.  Boston Globe, March 1, 2011. 
2. McConville C. Ex-Blue Cross CEO walks away with $11M. Boston Herald, March 2, 2011.
3. Weisman R. Blue Cross CEO got $8.6m in exit deal. Boston Globe, March 2, 2011.
4. McConville C, Chabot H. Trio publicly crusade against rising health costs: behind the shield. Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
5. McGrory B. Such health pay, it's sick. Boston Globe, March 4, 2011.
6. Levenson M, Weisman R. 2 Blue Cross directors justify stipends. March 8, 2011.
7. Crimaldi L, Dwinnell J. Blue Cross board suspends pay, CEO perks cut. Boston Herald, March 8, 2011.
8. Cheney K. Amid outrage, Blue Cross chief fights to 'reclaim' company's standing. Enterprise News, March 10, 2011.
9. Gelzinis P. Cleve Killingsworth's New York castle not shielded from bad taste. Boston Herald, March 11, 2011.
10. Egan M. You call this health care? - it's nauseating.  Boston Herald, March 3, 2011.
11.  Jackson DZ. No wonder health costs are so high.  Boston Globe, March 5, 2011.

Hackensack University Medical Center CEO's $5 Million Golden Parachute: "the Public Will Perceive the Institution as a Kind of Insider's Group"

Last year was an embarassing one for Hackensack University Medical Center (HUMC), a large academic medical center affiliated with the University of Medicine and Dentistry of New Jersey.  In April, former state senator Joseph Coniglio was convicted of fraud (against the public) and extortion for a scheme that involved him being paid $5000 a month for undefined consulting work for HUMC while he promoted the hospital's interests in the state legislature (see post here).  A subsequent investigative report revealed widespread self-dealing on the part of the HUMC board (see post here).  Soon after, the HUMC CEO, John Ferguson, announced his retirement, per the Newark Star-Ledger.

Scandal Leads to Apparent Reforms

So when I read an article from last week on NorthJersey.com entitled "Hackensack University Medical Center works to revamp reputation hurt by trial" I hoped that these travails lead to some real improvements in the leadership and governance of the institution.  Hope springs eternal, and the article did describe some apparent progress.

The medical center's board of trustees was streamlined:

the hospital's board of governors — once a 57-member behemoth run by a core group of powerful and politically connected members — was whittled to less than half its former size and is now overseen by what the hospital is calling a 'reinvigorated' parent company, Hillcrest Health Service System Inc.

Conflicts of interest and self-dealing were apparently banned

Members of the two boards may no longer do business directly with the hospital — a significant change because some of them own or work for companies that have been paid millions of dollars by Hackensack. In 2009 alone, these companies were paid $13.2 million by the hospital, according to its federal tax filings. They were paid $17.4 million in 2008.

The Devil in the Details
Although the board was reduced in size, it gained almost no new members, and the politically-connected members who previously were accused of self-dealing remained:

Serving as chairman of the board of governors is Joseph M. Sanzari, a construction magnate, multimillion-dollar donor and longtime board member. His company, a joint venture with former board Chairman J. Fletcher Creamer Jr., has been one of the highest-paid independent contractors at the medical center.

Also,

There were no new board members until Tuesday, when two were appointed. Many who held influential positions on the board of governors — including Sanzari, Creamer and Joseph Simunovich — are still in key roles.

Furthermore, there was a big loop-hole in the apparent ban on conflicts of interest and self-dealing:

members of both the board of governors and Hillcrest can still do business with the hospital as long as they work as subcontractors or move to the foundation board or a newly created advisory panel that doesn't have voting or fiduciary powers.

Also,

Members of the board of governors and Hillcrest still can be hired as subcontractors.

The ban on doing business with the hospital also doesn't cover members of the advisory panel or the board that oversees the foundation. About a dozen members of these two groups are affiliated with companies that have made money — millions, in some cases – in work with the hospital.

As one outside expert noted,

'They may have changed the structure, but if you don't change the people, you don't change the culture,' said Jamie Orlikoff, a governance expert who advises the National Hospital Association.

Furthermore,

'People who had influence and clout when they were members of a fiduciary board will still have influence and clout even if they are moved to an advisory board,' Orlikoff said.

So,

'The concern is that the public will perceive the institution as a kind of insider's group and things are being done to benefit them,' said Daniel Borochoff, president of the American Institute of Philanthropy.

The CEO's Golden Parachute

Hope spring eternal, but is too often crushed.  However, at least the former CEO is gone. But it turns out he got quite a going away present. As described in a companion article,

John P. Ferguson received a severance package of more than $5 million when he was forced out as president of Hackensack University Medical Center last year, bringing his total compensation for 2009 to $7.7 million, according to recent federal tax filings.

The other executives who presided over HUMC in 2009, the year that its former consultant was convicted, also did very well for themselves,

His senior vice president for operations, Doreen Santora, received $2.6 million — including more than $1.5 million in severance — when she left in the executive reshuffling that followed, the documents show.

In all, seven top executives at the non-profit hospital each received more than $1 million in total compensation in 2009, up from five the year before.

This extremely generous compensation could not be related to the financial success of the hospital at the time:

The compensation packages came in a year in which tax filings show the 775-bed medical center employed 317 fewer staff and Moody's Investors Service downgraded its credit rating to Baa1, leading to higher interest payments when new debt is issued.

If this was pay for performance, by what measure these executives' performance was measured was not clear. Actually, who even decided to award them such sumptuous pay was unclear:

only a handful of board members were aware of the millions of dollars in pay and perks that had been handed out to executives over the last few years. Several employees saw their overall compensation double or triple.

Board members expressed 'sticker shock' when they first learned of the compensation numbers at a fall 2009 meeting, said J. Fletcher Creamer Jr., who completed his term as chairman of the board of governors in March.

'We went through every single executive' whose salaries must be disclosed on the IRS form for non-profit institutions, Creamer said in an interview earlier this year. 'It's the first time they actually saw it. … We always made the numbers available if they wanted to come see it, but not everyone looked.'

Keep in mind that per the first NorthJersey.com article, Mr Creamer will still be in a "key role" at HUMC, his failure to think that top executives' compensation was something his fellow board members needed to consider notwithstanding.

Summary

Is this any way to run a hospital "which has a national reputation for quality care?" The hospital leadership did and still appears to be an "insider's group" which works to promote its own self-interest.

As we have said before, far too often the leaders of not-for-profit health care institutions seem more interested in padding their own bottom lines than upholding the institutions' missions. They often seem entirely unaware of their duty to put those missions ahead of their own self-interest. Like the financial services sector in the era of "greed is good," health care too often seems run by "insiders hijacking established institutions for their personal benefit." True health care reform would encourage leadership of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who see a quick way to make a small fortune.

On the Interconnectedness of the Leadership of Health Care Organizations: the Abbott Laboratories Case

We just posted about some misbehavior by Abbott Laboratories: a physician Abbott paid as a "key opinion leader" to help market its cardiac stents was accused of inserting stents in many patients who had no need for them; Abbott settled for over $400 million a lawsuit alleging the company defrauded Medicare and Medicaid; and it settled an unrelated suit for over $40 million alleging the company paid kickbacks to physicians for prescribing its drugs.  I thus thought it would be interesting to see how well paid are the corporate leaders who presided over these activities, and who are the board members who were supposed to be providing stewardship of this company.

According to the company's 2010 proxy statement, the five highest-paid executives were:

Miles D White, Chairman of the Board and CEO - $26,213,966 total compensation
Thomans C Freyman, Executive Vice President, Finance, and CFO - $9,561,227
Olivier Bohuon, Executive Vice President, Abbott Pharmaceutica Group - $5,232,589
Laura J Schumacher, Executive Vice President, General Counsel, and Secretary - $5,724,060
James V Mazzo, Senior Vice President, Abbott Medical Optics - $10,394,085

Now, let us turn to the company's board of directors.  Note that I looked for board members who also held leadership positions in other health care organizations whose interests may not be aligned with the corporation.  I also looked for those who held leadership positions in the discredited financial services corporation who helped usher in the global financial collapse.  (I  used similar methodolgy here.)

Abbott currently has 12 board members, including

• Robert J Alpert MD - Ensign Professor of Medicine, Professor of Internal Medicine, and Dean of the Yale School of Medicine.  He also "serves as a Director on the Board of Yale-New Haven Hospital."
• Roxanne S Austin - President and Chief Executive Officer, Move Networks Inc, and President, Austin Investment Advisors
• William M Daley -"Vice Chairman and Head of the Office of Corporate Responsibility and Chairman of the Midwest, JP Morgan Chase & Co."  He is the board of directors of  "Loyola University of Chicago and Northwestern University."
• W James Farrell - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Illinois Tool Works Inc
• H Laurence Fuller - Retired Co-Chairman of BP Amoco, former chief executive officer of Amoco
• William A Osborne - Retired Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of Northern Trust Corporation and the Northern Trust Company.  He is "Chairman of the Board of Trustees of Northwestern University."
• Rt Honorable Lord Owen - Chairman of Europe Steel Ltd
• Roy S Roberts - Managing Director, Reliant Equity Investors.
• Samuel C Scott III - Retired Chairman,  President and Chief Executive Officer of Corn Products International.  He "currently serves on the board of directors of Bank of New York Mellon Corporation."  He also is on the board of "Northwestern Healthcare."
• William D Smithburg - Retired Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of Quaker Oats Company.  He is on the "board of trustees of Northwestern University."
• Glenn F Tilton - Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer of UAL Corporation and United Airlines Inc.  He is on the "board of directors of Northwestern Memorial Hospital."
• Miles D White - Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer, Abbott Laboratories, "is on the board of trustees of "Northwestern University." 

Of Abbott's 12 directors, seven have leadership positions at teaching hospitals, academic medical centers, medical schools or their parent universities (Northwestern University, its medical school and teaching hospitals, in particular, are stewarded by six Abbott directors). 

Two have leadership positions in  financial services corporations that were implicated in the global financial collapse.  (Note that JP Morgan Chase staffers helped to invent some of the kinds of financial derivatives widely viewed as causative of the collapse, but the firm itself did not fail. [See Tett G. Fool's Gold.]  Through TARP, the US government took preferred equity stakes in both JP Morgan Chase and Bank of New York Mellon.  [See Ritholtz B.  Bailout Nation. p. 222]) 

Two more are leaders of financial services firms.  All but one are current or former high-level hired executives (seven are or were CEOs), or chairpersons or co-chair persons of corporations (the one exception is a dean of a medical school.) 

Note how similar our findings were here to those found after our perusal of the boards of Genzyme and Medtronic (see post here).   So we find again that executives of health care organizations who preside over various questionable activities not only rarely pay any penalty, but usually become extremely wealthy in the process.

We also find how interconnected is the leadership of health care.  The boards and leadership of drug and device companies overlap with the boards and leadership of medical schools, teaching hospitals, and their parent universities. 

Yet, as we have noted before, there are obvious conflicts.  In particular, teaching hospitals and medical schools are supposed to provide unbiased teaching, including about issues relevant to drug and device corporations, such as choice of diagnostic strategies and treatments, and relevant health policy.  They are supposed to perform unbiased research, including research that evaluates drugs and devices.  They are supposed to provide the best possible patient care at a reasonable cost, which relates to choices of and prices paid for drugs and devices. 

On the other hand, drug and device companies are supposed to put making a profit for their share-holders first.  The directors of such companies, like the directors of all for-profit corporations, are supposed to show an unyielding loyalty to their companies' financial health and profits, although contemporary corporate directors have been accused of acting more like cronies of the hired management.  (See this post.)

Also, we note that the vast majority of people chosen as stewards of a given health care organization are current or former top hired executives of other corporations.  The board members, that is, stewards of health care organizations, to whom the top hired executives reports, are usually not people with large ownership interests in the organizations (in the case of public, for-profit corporations.)  For the most part, they also do not seem to be people with clearly demonstrated devotion to the values of health care, in particular, putting the care of individual patients first, and advancing health care teaching and research.  Instead, they seem to be people with the perspective of hired executives, who may be prone to putting the interests of hired executives, rather than patients, doctors, teachers, scientists or the public at large, first.

So here is another admittedly limited case study of the board of directors, that is, the ostensible stewards of a health care corporation, selected this time because of its history of ethical missteps, which showed  - that the leadership of health care organizations is incredibly interrelated, interlocked, incestuous.  Again, it appears that top leaders of various health care organizations may be more familiar with and identify more with each other, and with other hired executives and managers, than with their organizations, their organizations' missions, and their organizations' professionals, staff, students, clients, and patients.

So to repeat-

I strongly believe that there needs to be much more investigation, academic, journalistic, and perhaps legal, of the identity, nature, and culture of the leaders of health care, and their relationships. A few bloggers cannot do it all. Obviously, the anechoic effect mitigates against medical and health care academics looking into their own leaders. However, failing to understand who is leading our march to the brink of health care failure ought not to be something such academics would want on their conscience.

Finally, and obviously, health care organizations need leaders that uphold the core values of health care, and focus on and are accountable for the mission, not on secondary responsibilities that conflict with these values and their mission, and not on self-enrichment. Leaders ought to be rewarded reasonably, but not lavishly, for doing what ultimately improves patient care, or when applicable, good education and good research.

If we do not fix the severe problems affecting the leadership and governance of health care, and do not increase accountability, integrity and transparency of health care leadership and governance, we will be as much to blame as the leaders when the system collapses.

What a Conflicted Web We Weave: Academic Economists, Finance, the Global Economic Meltdown, and the Impending Health Care Collapse

We have been writing about conflicts of interest in health care now for a long time.  We started with a focus on academic physicians'  and leaders' financial ties to pharmaceutical/ biotechnology/ device companies, then went on to the intense conflicts generated by academic medical and other health care non-profit leader who also sit on boards of directors of for profit health care corporations, and to conflicts affecting various kinds of respected not-for-profit health care organizations, like medical societies and patient advocacy groups.

Meanwhile, we uncovered the curious dominance of the boards of some health care organizations by leaders in the finance world, including some of the leaders of the failed companies that brought us the "great recession."  This did seem like a leadership problem for health care, in terms of the dominance of health care leadership by the elite of another industry that did not exactly seem to share the values we physicians swear to uphold.  However, it did not seem to be a conflict of interest problem, until now.

The Chronicle of Higher Education just published an article by the director of a soon to be released documentary on conflicts of interest and academics, but this time academic economics.

Charles Ferguson, the author, used as an example the Larry Summers, the former President of Harvard University (and hence leader of the Harvard Medical School, School of Public Health, and Harvard's teaching hospitals).  We had commented here about Summers' poor fit for the role of an academic medical leader, and here and here about the dominance of Harvard leadership by leaders of (sometimes failed) financial institutions.  Ferguson summarized (bad pun, sorry) the problem thus:

Summers is unquestionably brilliant, as all who have dealt with him, including myself, quickly realize. And yet rarely has one individual embodied so much of what is wrong with economics, with academe, and indeed with the American economy.

The problem is essentially one of huge conflicts of interest:

the revolving door is now a three-way intersection. Summers's career is the result of an extraordinary and underappreciated scandal in American society: the convergence of academic economics, Wall Street, and political power.

Summers bear huge responsibility for the current economic mess:

Consider: As a rising economist at Harvard and at the World Bank, Summers argued for privatization and deregulation in many domains, including finance. Later, as deputy secretary of the treasury and then treasury secretary in the Clinton administration, he implemented those policies. Summers oversaw passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, which repealed Glass-Steagall, permitted the previously illegal merger that created Citigroup, and allowed further consolidation in the financial sector. He also successfully fought attempts by Brooksley Born, chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission in the Clinton administration, to regulate the financial derivatives that would cause so much damage in the housing bubble and the 2008 economic crisis. He then oversaw passage of the Commodity Futures Modernization Act, which banned all regulation of derivatives, including exempting them from state antigambling laws.

Also,

Over the past decade, Summers continued to advocate financial deregulation, both as president of Harvard and as a University Professor after being forced out of the presidency.

Not only did Summers set up the structure that allowed reckless bets with other people' money on opaque financial derivatives by finance leaders who stood to make huge gains if they won their bets, but could foist all losses on others, but he actively attempted those who tried to warn us all of the impending economic collapse.

Summers remained close to Rubin and to Alan Greenspan, a former chairman of the Federal Reserve. When other economists began warning of abuses and systemic risk in the financial system deriving from the environment that Summers, Greenspan, and Rubin had created, Summers mocked and dismissed those warnings. In 2005, at the annual Jackson Hole, Wyo., conference of the world's leading central bankers, the chief economist of the International Monetary Fund, Raghuram Rajan, presented a brilliant paper that constituted the first prominent warning of the coming crisis. Rajan pointed out that the structure of financial-sector compensation, in combination with complex financial products, gave bankers huge cash incentives to take risks with other people's money, while imposing no penalties for any subsequent losses. Rajan warned that this bonus culture rewarded bankers for actions that could destroy their own institutions, or even the entire system, and that this could generate a 'full-blown financial crisis' and a 'catastrophic meltdown.'

When Rajan finished speaking, Summers rose up from the audience and attacked him, calling him a 'Luddite,' dismissing his concerns, and warning that increased regulation would reduce the productivity of the financial sector. (Ben Bernanke, Tim Geithner, and Alan Greenspan were also in the audience.)

Amazingly, rather than ending up an economic pariah after that, Summers regained power over the economy in the last few years.

Then, after the 2008 financial crisis and its consequent recession, Summers was placed in charge of coordinating U.S. economic policy, deftly marginalizing others who challenged him. Under the stewardship of Summers, Geithner, and Bernanke, the Obama administration adopted policies as favorable toward the financial sector as those of the Clinton and Bush administrations—quite a feat. Never once has Summers publicly apologized or admitted any responsibility for causing the crisis. And now Harvard is welcoming him back.

Summers was tightly aligned with the finance world, and benefited from the dominance of financial leaders on Harvard's board (see post here):

After Summers left the Clinton administration, his candidacy for president of Harvard was championed by his mentor Robert Rubin, a former CEO of Goldman Sachs, who was his boss and predecessor as treasury secretary. Rubin, after leaving the Treasury Department—where he championed the law that made Citigroup's creation legal—became both vice chairman of Citigroup and a powerful member of Harvard's governing board.

Yet in between his government and academic leadership roles, Summers got rich from finance firms' money.

Summers became wealthy through consulting and speaking engagements with financial firms. Between 2001 and his entry into the Obama administration, he made more than $20-million from the financial-services industry. (His 2009 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $17-million to $39-million.)

Ferguson went on to list several other conflicted academic economists:

The route to the 2008 financial crisis, and the economic problems that still plague us, runs straight through the economics discipline. And it's due not just to ideology; it's also about straightforward, old-fashioned money.

Prominent academic economists (and sometimes also professors of law and public policy) are paid by companies and interest groups to testify before Congress, to write papers, to give speeches, to participate in conferences, to serve on boards of directors, to write briefs in regulatory proceedings, to defend companies in antitrust cases, and, of course, to lobby. [Ed: they are thus the "key opinion leaders" of economics and economic policy.]  This is now, literally, a billion-dollar industry. The Law and Economics Consulting Group, started 22 years ago by professors at the University of California at Berkeley (David Teece in the business school, Thomas Jorde in the law school, and the economists Richard Gilbert and Gordon Rausser), is now a $300-million publicly held company. Others specializing in the sale (or rental) of academic expertise include Competition Policy (now Compass Lexecon), started by Richard Gilbert and Daniel Rubinfeld, both of whom served as chief economist of the Justice Department's Antitrust Division in the Clinton administration; the Analysis Group; and Charles River Associates.

In my film you will see many famous economists looking very uncomfortable when confronted with their financial-sector activities; others appear only on archival video, because they declined to be interviewed. You'll hear from:

Martin Feldstein, a Harvard professor, a major architect of deregulation in the Reagan administration, president for 30 years of the National Bureau of Economic Research, and for 20 years on the boards of directors of both AIG, which paid him more than $6-million, and AIG Financial Products, whose derivatives deals destroyed the company. Feldstein has written several hundred papers, on many subjects; none of them address the dangers of unregulated financial derivatives or financial-industry compensation.

Glenn Hubbard, chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers in the first George W. Bush administration, dean of Columbia Business School, adviser to many financial firms, on the board of Metropolitan Life ($250,000 per year), and formerly on the board of Capmark, a major commercial mortgage lender, from which he resigned shortly before its bankruptcy, in 2009. In 2004, Hubbard wrote a paper with William C. Dudley, then chief economist of Goldman Sachs, praising securitization and derivatives as improving the stability of both financial markets and the wider economy.

Frederic Mishkin, a professor at the Columbia Business School, and a member of the Federal Reserve Board from 2006 to 2008. He was paid $124,000 by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a paper praising its regulatory and banking systems, two years before the Icelandic banks' Ponzi scheme collapsed, causing $100-billion in losses. His 2006 federal financial-disclosure form listed his net worth as $6-million to $17-million.

Laura Tyson, a professor at Berkeley, director of the National Economic Council in the Clinton administration, and also on the Board of Directors of Morgan Stanley, which pays her $350,000 per year.

Richard Portes, a professor at London Business School and founding director of the British Centre for Economic Policy Research, paid by the Icelandic Chamber of Commerce to write a report praising Iceland's financial system in 2007, only one year before it collapsed.

And John Campbell, chairman of Harvard's economics department, who finds it very difficult to explain why conflicts of interest in economics should not concern us.

I once naively thought that the primary conflict of interest problems affecting academia involved health care, the dependence of medical schools and academic medical centers on commercial research funding, the emphasis these schools placed on faculty ties to commercial firms, leading to faculty "key opinion leaders" functioning as marketers of drugs and devices operating under the cloak of academia, and the major conflicts of academic leaders who also sit on health care corporate boards.

Now I wonder if all this came to pass because academic leaders already were comfortable with conflicts of interest after having profited from conflicts generated by relationships with the finance industry.

This now suggests that the dominance of university boards of trustees by finance leaders is a conflict of interest issue, too.

It also suggests that we in medicine should be paying more attention to how conflicts of interest shape not only the marketing of drugs and devices, but the health care policy that has lead to our currently dysfunctional system. If economists paid by finance companies could have been a major cause of the global financial meltdown, could health care policy experts paid by health care corporations be a major cause of our collapsing health care system?

Hat tip to the Naked Capitalism blog. See additional comments on the University Diaries blog and on Felix Salmon's blog.

Health Care Leaders in Maine Fail to Learn from Past Experience

From down east Maine comes a telling story about the problems of contemporary health care leadership.  I assembled this case from three articles by Meg Haskell in the Bangor Daily News, links are below. (1-3)

Complaints About the CEO's Clinical Policies

The story begins with complaints about clinical policies instituted by the CEO of Acadia Hospital.

[Acadia CEO David] Proffitt has come under fire in recent weeks from current and former Acadia Hospital employees who say the incidence and severity of staff injuries have risen since he initiated a policy that essentially eliminates the use of mechanical and physical restraints with mentally ill patients who become violent. (2)

The concerns were raised with government agencies:

Since the end of July, the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration has been conducting an on-site investigation into employee complaints of unsafe working conditions at Acadia. The state Department of Health and Human Services also recently has investigated conditions at Acadia, with a report due later this month. (2)

Furthermore,

The OSHA investigation was triggered earlier this summer by a complaint filed with the agency alleging an increase in patient assaults on staff after Proffitt implemented stricter standards against the use of mechanical and physical restraints, even when patients turn violent.(3)

Loss of Experienced Clinicians

There were also concerns that Mr Proffitt presided over the loss of experienced clinicians who were replaced by those with less experience

Employees also have alleged that Proffitt has fired or pushed out a number of clinical leaders at Acadia, including former Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and former Chief Nursing Officer April Giard. They have criticized his replacements as lacking expertise in psychiatric care.(3)

Lack of Clinical Experience or Training, Questionable Educational Credentials

Given his direct involvement in clinical decision making, it surprising that Mr Proffitt has no clinical training or experience:

Proffitt’s academic qualifications also have been questioned.

Proffitt’s education includes a 1984 bachelor’s degree in therapeutic recreation from the University of Nebraska at Omaha, a 1989 master’s degree in recreational administration from Arizona State University, and a 2007 doctoral degree in health administration from Warren National University, now a defunct, unaccredited on-line program. His academic career has been criticized as being inadequate to prepare him for the top-level positions he has held at both Riverview and Acadia, although neither position requires a doctoral degree.(2)

Repeating the Past

It turns out that similar concerns were raised about Proffitt's performance in his previous position:

Psychiatrists formerly employed at Riverview said this week that both patient care and employee morale eroded under Proffitt’s leadership there.

'Over the course of David Proffitt’s tenure at Riverview, a significant number of long-standing and experienced staff left and were replaced with less experienced or temporary people,' said Dr. Bryan Woods, who was employed at Riverview from 2003 to 2006 and now practices in Portland. “\'In my opinion, this resulted in a decrease in the quality of patient care.'

Woods said Proffitt’s management style was often in conflict with the collaborative 'treatment team' approach commonly used in acute-care psychiatric settings.

'Ultimately, I left, because I simply could not work with him,' Woods said.

Woods’ colleague Dr. Dan Filene, who also worked at Riverview under Proffitt, said direct-care staff at the state hospital were placed at increased risk by a stringent policy that all but eliminated the use of any kind of restraints.

'The staff at Riverview are heroic,' he said. 'It’s not just dangerous; it is emotionally challenging, fatiguing, low-paying work. When they are actively being injured, it can’t help but affect patient care.' Filene stressed that most people with mental illness are not dangerous or violent.

Sen. Stanley Gerzofsky, D-Brunswick, is chairman of the Legislature’s Criminal Justice Committee. The committee oversees the locked forensic unit at Riverview, where criminals with severe mental illness are housed and treated. Proffitt’s policy of doing away with restraints for even the most dangerous patients prompted a number of complaints, he said.

'We heard concerns that staff members were being injured [by patients],' Gerzofsky said in an interview this week. 'Staff were complaining that [Proffitt] didn’t have the right credentials and that he didn’t take the violence very seriously. We had him in front of our committee several times.'

Gerzofsky’s colleague on the committee, Sen. John Nutting, D-Leeds, said he heard from several Riverview patient families and staff members.

'Legislators were called to see if he could be replaced,' he said. 'There was really just one single reason — he was telling doctors how to treat their patients. He was trying to get between the patients and their doctors.

Nutting said parents of patients were especially concerned.

'They wanted their loved ones to get the care their doctors wanted them to receive, not the CEO of the hospital,' he said.(2)

Proffitt's credentials were also questioned before:

Proffitt’s degrees in recreational therapy and his online doctorate, Nutting observed, did little to reassure worried families.(2)

Proffitt's Defenders

The allegations made against Proffitt, which appear to be from clinical professionals and patients' relatives, were countered by support from, perhaps not surprisingly, managers and executives:

Michelle Hood, CEO of the hospital’s corporate parent Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, says that under Proffitt, Acadia is 'moving in the right direction.' She lauded the progress he has made toward de-stigmatizing mental illness and ramping up Acadia’s outpatient and community services.

Note that Michelle Hood, although she has considerable health care management experience, appears not to have any clinical experience of expertise, from her official biography:

Before arriving at EMHS, Michelle was president and CEO of the Sisters of Charity of Leavenworth Health System, Montana Region, as well as president and CEO of its flagship hospital, St. Vincent Healthcare. She received her Bachelor of Science in 1978 at Purdue University and her Master of Health Care Administration at Georgia State University in 1981. Her early career included roles of associate hospital director at Emory University Hospital in Atlanta Georgia, executive vice president and chief operating officer of St. Vincent’s Hospital (of now Ascension Health) in Birmingham, Alabama and chief administrative officer of Norton Hospital in Louisville, Kentucky.

Somehow, the process that hired Mr Proffitt, presided over by Ms Hood, did not seem to consider his previous work at Riverview:

At EMHS, Michelle Hood said Proffitt’s troubles at Riverview 'did not come up' during his interviews for the position of CEO at Acadia.

One of 16 applicants in a nationwide search to replace outgoing CEO Dorothy Hill, he had appropriate letters of reference from former employers, she said.(2)

By the way, the process involved checking whether his educational credentials were accurate, but apparently was unconcerned with the meaning of an on-line degree from an unaccredited institution (subsequently closed down by state authorities, see here.)

His educational credentials checked out.... (2)

Hood dismissed concerns about losses of experienced staff:

Asked about the loss of key clinical administrators at Acadia, including Vice President for Medical Affairs Dr. Paul Tisher and Chief Nursing Officer April Giard, Hood said 'turnover is normal' with a new administration and that Proffitt has successfully recruited new talent and promoted qualified staff from within the organization.

The board of trustees of Acadia Hospital also supported their CEO

At the end of last week, John Bragg, chairman of the hospital’s board of directors, said the board supports embattled CEO David Proffitt, despite a deluge of concerns raised by current and former employees and unflattering revelations about Proffitt’s educational credentials and his leadership at his previous post.

At its regular meeting last Wednesday, the board went into executive session to discuss the situation, Bragg said Friday.

'We came out supporting Dr. Proffitt and the changes that are in place and the team he has put together,' he said.

As best as I can tell, Mr Bragg is the President of a local industrial firm, N H Bragg.

By the way, here is what George Eaton, chairman of the board of Eastern Maine Healthcare Systems, the parent not-for-profit corporation for Acadia Hospital, said about the executives that are accountable to him:

By making critical decisions, engaging in aggressive fundraising and other activities, 'exceptional senior executives can and should add many multiples of what they cost to the value of the institution,' he said. Eaton said CEO compensation packages within EMHS are determined using information from comparable institutions nationwide.(1)

Also,

The job of the CEO is 'incredibly complex,' working in 'the most regulated environment in any industry,' Eaton said.

'The prudent thing to do is to get the best people you can,' he said, 'and pay them what you need to in order to retain them — so long as they are achieving the performance goals set by their board.'

Note that Mr Eaton appears to be an attorney, according to the EMHS site, "George F. Eaton II, Esq.; Bangor; attorney, Rudman & Winchell."
Summary

This case illustrates much of what has gone wrong with leadership and governance of health care organizations.

We see health care organizations lead by people who have no experience or training in actually giving health care. Yet people who are not doctors, nurses, or therapists make clinical policies and control clinical care, even against the advice of experienced clinicians. In fact, some such leaders seem to regard clinicians as interchangeable widget-makers making interchangeable widgets. The ill-informed leaders of health care organizations often seem sensitive about their lack of knowledge and experience, and hence may be quick to punish any health care professional who protests their ill-informed decisions.  Moreover, the ill-informed leaders of health care seem to band together to support each other, even in the face of criticism from people with real expertise in health care, or from patients and relatives directly affected by health care and how it is delivered.  Higher level executives who are supposed to supervise lower level executives, and boards of directors which are supposed to exercise stewardship and support institutional values may seem more concerned with protecting the prerogatives of all executives rather than than the patient care mission.

As we have said again, again, again, health care desperately needs leadership that understand the context, and believes in the values.  It needs leaders that puts patients first, ahead of the pay and prerogatives of the executive and managerial class, our would-be new aristocracy.

References


1.  Haskell M. Maine's hospitals: big jobs, big pay. Bangor Daily News, March 6, 2009.  Link.


2.  Haskell M. Acadia CEO criticized at previous post.  Bangor Daily News, September 10, 2010.  Link.


3.  Haskell M. Acadia board supports CEO despite claims.  Bangor Daily News, September 20, 2010.  Link. 

More Than $1 Million to Run a Public Health Agency

After a well-publicized story that managers of small town in California were paid in the high six-figures, reporters in California have gotten interested in the pay of public officials.

Thus the San Diego Union-Tribune reported on the compensation received by CEOs of local public health agencies, called public health care districts, two of which run hospitals. One in particular received generous compensation:

The top official at Palomar Pomerado Health, a public agency serving health-care needs in Poway and Escondido, receives in excess of $1 million in compensation per year.


Michael Covert, who has run the North County hospital district since 2003, receives a base salary of $736,000 a year. Retirement, bonuses and other benefits push Covert’s total pay past $1.1 million.

One other public health CEO, also responsible for a hospital, made somewhat less:

Tri-City chief executive Larry Anderson collects a base salary of $480,000 and benefits that drive his total compensation past $625,000 a year. He also received a $50,000 relocation benefit when he arrived last year.

Two CEOs of health districts that did not run hospitals, having leased them out, made less still:

Grossmont chief executive Barry Jantz makes about $183,000 a year in base pay and benefits that increase his total compensation to just under $250,000 a year.

Fallbrook administrator Vi Dupre, ... is paid a base salary of $61,000 a year and benefits that raise her compensation to just over $69,000,....

Why is Mr Covert paid so much?

Bruce Krider, the health-care district chairman, said Covert does an excellent job managing a complex enterprise that includes two major hospitals. Covert juggles the interests of staff, physicians, patients, volunteers, board members and other stakeholders, he said.

'A million dollars sounds pretty good to anybody, but my view is, pay a lot and expect a lot,' said Krider, a management consultant who also is a former hospital executive. 'You can’t have some mediocre public servant. You need somebody that has got vision, that can see the issues that are most important and put it all together.'

So now even the managers of public health agencies have become million dollar babies. And of course, according to the boards of trustees who are supposed to supervise them, they all do excellent work and therefore are underpaid even then. As we have noted before, it seems that every board supervising every health care executive thinks their executives are above average, if not stellar. Note, though, that the chair of the board overseeing Mr Covert is himself a retired hospital administrator. So, as we have noted before, it seems that the boards of such organizations often have a preponderance of members who are not inclined to be critical of their hired executives, much less limit their pay.

So the rules for top leaders of health care organizations seem to be different from those for you and me.  All these managers seem to be entitled to be above average.  (The only ones who are eventually deemed below average seem to be those up to no good in ways that do not financially benefit their organizations, e.g., see this.)

In my humble opinion, it is unseemly for the leader of a government run public health organization to make so much. 

True health care reform would decrease perverse incentives throughout the systems, spread the power in organizations more broadly, and make leaders accountable.

A Golden Parachute for Captain Outrageous

A year ago, I posted about leadership and governance problems at Northeast Health Systems, a small hospital system located in neighboring Massachusetts.  The colorful story included leaders who solicited money from the community but concealed what they were doing from the same community, an adolescent pregnancy pact after the hospital system refused to provide confidential birth control information at the high school clinic it ran, a hospital vice-president accused of art theft, various cuts, some concealed, of medical services, accusations of conflicts of interest affecting the board of trustees, and no-confidence votes by nurses and physicians. Finally, Stephen Laverty, the CEO held responsible for much of the mess, resigned and things quieted down a bit.  However, he left a system in deficit, leading to further lay-offs, (e.g., see this story in the Boston Globe).  And the vice-president accused of art theft was also "arraigned on bribery and larceny charges" (also per the Boston Globe.)

Yet, Mr Laverty collected a tidy sum just to leave, as the Salem News just reported:

Former Northeast Health System President and CEO Stephen Laverty collected more than $1 million from the nonprofit hospital chain after he resigned under fire in the fall of 2008, newly released financial records show.

The earnings, $1.08 million in total, include a settlement package of more than a year's salary plus pay for the one month the controversial Laverty was at the helm of Northeast, which owns Beverly Hospital, as well as Gloucester's Addison Gilbert Hospital.

The documents provide the first details of how much Northeast, now laying off workers and cutting costs, was willing to pay to part ways with its CEO who had just endured no-confidence votes from nurses and doctors, plus the arrest of one of his top managers.

Neither the hospital system nor its former CEO was exactly forthcoming about the rationale for this payment:

As part of Laverty's resignation, both sides agreed not to discuss the settlement or any of the details that led them to part ways.

'I have no understanding of what you are talking about,' Laverty said yesterday afternoon from his home in Concord, when asked about his settlement package. He then hung up the phone.

A spokeswoman for Northeast Health System said she could not comment on Laverty or the terms of any agreements between the company and past employees.

So even the hired manager of a small community hospital system is entitled to a million dollar plus golden parachute when resigning in disgrace. This is another great example of the current perversity of the incentives given to hired health care managers. Even small community hospitals, the backbone of real community health care throughout the country, seem to feel obligated to make millionaires out of their managers, no matter how bad their performance.

As we said before, the problem is not just the money wasted paying for bad performance. These perverse incentives are likely to encourage worse performance.  They send the message to even the worst executives that they are wonderful people, they can do no wrong, and should stand for no criticism, all further diverting them from what they really are supposed to be doing: upholding the mission.

As an editorial in the Gloucester Times noted, although the nexus is perverse incentives given to paid managers, it is not only the paid managers who are to blame for this situation.

The other party to his contract was the Northeast Board of Trustees.

So,

Those who want to serve as trustees of Northeast need to get the notion out of their heads that their board seats are not just resume builders — with high-profile community roles and a few corporate dinners thrown in. These are positions of community leadership and responsibility that comes with a measure of accountability.

New Northeast CEO Ken Hanover has indeed seemingly ushered in a new era of relative openness in dealing with the community. But the same cannot be said for the Board of Trustees.

If Laverty's shameful buyout deal and these types of contracts are examples of their 'leadership' and responsibility, each and every one of them should step down now.

As we have said many times before, true health care reform would encourage leaders of health care who understand health care and care about its mission, rather than those who just see a quick road to riches or social respectability.